The "racial democracy" (Iberian exceptionalism) thesis claims that racial prejudice in Latin America is not only lower than that found in the United States but is essentially absent altogether. We explored the plausibility of this thesis by the use of both explicit and implicit prejudice measures among Blacks and Whites from the United States and three Caribbean nations. In general, the results showed significant racial prejudice against Blacks and in favor of Whites in all four nations. African Americans were the only participants not to show significant implicit prejudice either in favor of or against Blacks. In addition, North Americans (i.e., participants from the United States) displayed lower implicit and explicit racial prejudice than participants in each of the three Latino nations. Overall, the results clearly contradicted the thesis of racial democracy and suggest that Latin America may not be nearly as egalitarian as some have argued.
and Puritan doctrines of North American Protestantism, Catholicism regarded Native Americans, and even African slaves, as people with souls and equally beloved of God; thus, the Catholic conquerors were less averse to intermixing with them. Finally, in contrast to the colonists of North America, the early Latin American colonists did not venture into the New World with intact families. As a result, the Iberian colonists established sexual and emotional relationships with the Indian and African slave women rather quickly, creating a more positive attitude toward those of African descent and resulting in the high rates of miscegenation we see today in Latin America (Degler, 1986; Freyre, 1951) . As a result, they argue that broad-based social movements like the Civil Rights Movement in the United States were not necessary because of the more egalitarian nature of race relations in Latin America.
However, the thesis of racial democracy in Latin America has come under increasing attack by critical race theorists. Given the fact that Whites enjoy discernible advantages over Blacks in areas such as health, education, income, profession, status, and political power in many of the Latino countries-including Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic (see Minority Rights Group, 1995; Wade, 1997) -the critical race theorists argue that the only exceptional thing about Latino race relations is the success with which Latin American nations have promulgated the myth rather than the reality of racial equality (Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998; Nobles, 2000) . Critics argue that proponents of the racial democracy thesis make the mistake of viewing race relations in Latin America through the prism of the racial dynamics found in the United States. As a result, racial democracy theorists have been insensitive to the distinct forms of racial exclusion that are practiced in Latin America. For example, Latin American countries have a history of "Whitening" privileges and laws that give jobs, land, tax breaks, and other benefits to European and Asian immigrants in an effort to decrease the relative portion of Blacks in Latin societies (Marx, 1998; Moya-Pons, 2000; Nobles, 2000; Wade, 1997) . Rather than trying to eliminate people of African descent through informal violence (e.g., pogroms), high rates of imprisonment, or execution, Latin America nations have opted to attenuate African influence via the process of dilution (Nobles, 2000) . Critics argue that the goal of both North and Latin America is still ultimately the same: White hegemony. Thus, racial democracy is seen as nothing but a myth functioning to maintain the very thing it denies-racial oppression (Twine, 1998) . Among other ways, this is accomplished by installing identification with and allegiance to the nation as a whole rather than to specific racial groups, thereby impeding the development of group-based social mobilization needed to confront real social grievances (Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998) . Further, they argue that, in the post-Civil Rights era in the United States, with the advent of more race-conscious policies and a recognition of formal disadvantage, comparisons of race relations in Latin America with the United States do not always favor Latin America (Degler, 1986; Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998) . They argue that the lack of social movements based on race and the denial of racial inequality have created a discursive space where overt racism flourishes but is denied due to the myth of racial democracy. In contrast, the United States, while still struggling to overcome the legacy of racial exclusion, has had to consciously address the lack of incorporation of Blacks in all areas of political, social, and economic life.
Nonetheless, critical race theorists have generally neglected to support their arguments by actually comparing the racial attitudes of Latin and North Americans empirically. It is quite possible that the economic and social disparities between Blacks and Whites are merely the persistent legacy of slavery and have nothing at all to do with ongoing racial prejudice. Moreover, even if racial prejudice continues to exist in Latin America, it is still possible that a weaker version of the racial democracy thesis is still valid. This is to say that, although still existent, racial prejudice might nonetheless be significantly weaker in Latin America than in North America.
One way of resolving this controversy would be to compare the racial prejudice of North and South American populations by use of standard survey instruments and explicit racial attitude measures. Although the use of explicit self-report racial attitude measures has been the standard means of assessing racial attitudes for the past 50 years, this technique may not be the most appropriate method of assessing racial prejudice. As is well known, explicit measures of prejudice suffer from the major problem of social desirability and self-presentation bias (e.g., Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978) . When faced with explicit, highly sensitive, and potentially inflammatory racial issues, participants often feel under considerable pressure to provide more politically acceptable responses than might be warranted (see, e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995 ; see also Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) . As a result, the use of explicit measures has led American race relations researchers to conclude that racial prejudice has been in a continuous decline over the past 40 years, whereas less obtrusive techniques (such as experiments and priming studies) indicate no such decline (Crosby et al., 1980; Wittenbrink et al., 1997) . The social desirability problem may be particularly troublesome within a Latin American context, where the promulgation of racial democracy as a dominant ideology has been widespread, even among the laity (Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998) . On the other hand, the lack of a consistent movement challenging racist discourse and practice may render Latin America behind the United States in terms of consciousness about racist discourse and practices. Therefore, there are fewer explicitly antiracist discourses and consciously positive images of Blacks and less social pressure to conform attitudes and discourse to socially desirable practice. On the other hand, there have been fewer formal barriers to racial equality. However, the gap between actual prejudice and what can be measured remains a methodological problem.
One increasingly popular solution to this social desirability problem in racial attitude research is to use implicit rather than explicit measures of prejudice. Implicit measures of prejudice are designed to measure racial attitudes in subtle ways that limit the effects of normative pressures to display nonprejudiced responses. This is accomplished by tapping into the more automatic, overlearned, and nonconscious aspect of group evaluations (Blair, 2001; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 1997) . Implicit measures of prejudice usually compare the efficiency with which participants associate positive versus negative information with targeted social categories. Thus, for example, by comparing the time participants take to pair "bad" with "Black" and "good" with "White" versus the time taken to pair "good" with "Black" and "bad" with "White," one can determine which set of pairings comes more easily to mind. If Bad-Black/Good-White pairings are more cognitively accessible than the opposite association, then participants can be regarded as racially prejudiced against Blacks relative to Whites.
Since their initial development in the early 1980s (e.g., Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) , implicit-attitude measures have been used widely to assess a variety of implicit (automatic) attitudes, including prejudice against Blacks, women, and generalized outgroups (see Blair, 2001) . Furthermore, these implicit prejudice indices have been found to predict not only other attitudes but actual behavior, such as expressed hostility as well (see, e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Payne, 2001) . In a culture embedded with racial stereotypes and a long history of racism, such as the United States, it has been consistently found that Whites find it easier to associate Black with bad and White with good than the reverse (see reviews by Blair, 2001, and Nosek, 2001 ; see also Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Kuehnen et al., 2001; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) . However, because these measures have never been used comparatively, it is difficult to assess the degree to which social learning might affect implicit associations on race. Whereas many suggest that a mix of political correctness and real social learning affect explicit measures of racism, it is unclear whether there might be a measurable social learning effect created by racial movements and policies in implicit associations. Comparative analysis allows us to examine the arguments of racial democracy as well as to examine the context effect of the Civil Rights Movement and its related policies that were never implemented in Latin America.
To explore the empirical plausibility of the racial democracy thesis, in this article, we compare levels of both explicit and implicit prejudice in the United States and three countries of Latin America: Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. The three Latin American nations selected have many cultural and historical similarities that are relevant for questions of race. First, all three Latin nations have had a similar pattern of Spanish conquest. Second, like the rest of Latin America, these three countries share a similar history of racial slavery. Although slavery began in the early 16th century, abolition did not occur until the 1800s in any of the three nations. Also, none of the countries have had major mass movements for racial equality. Last, these three countries predominantly have a White/Black racial composition that allows for the study of race relations between those of African and European ancestry-the indigenous populations were annihilated shortly after conquest in all three nations (see Duany, 2001; Humboldt, 1990; Moya-Pons, 2000) .
In addition, each country was selected to test specific aspects of the racial democracy thesis. Since the socialist revolution of 1959, and its assumed deep commitment to an egalitarian society and the confrontation of racism both at home and abroad, some have claimed that Cuba represents a society in which racism has been all but eliminated (de la Fuente, 1995) . To test the notion that miscegenation is a precursor to racial democracy, we have chosen as our second country the Dominican Republic. It is among the nations with the highest level of miscegenation (i.e., 73%) between people of European and African descent to be found anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, even in comparison to Brazil (Central Intelligence Agency, 2000) . Finally, to assess the limits of Latin America's racial democracy, we have chosen Puerto Rico because it is the only country in Latin America that is presently under U.S. control and has been since the Treaty of Paris in 1898. It seems reasonable to suspect that Puerto Rico has absorbed much of the general political values and racial ideology prevalent in the continental United States. However, all the factors that supposedly have led to Latin America's racial democracy are also part of Puerto Rico's history.
There are two versions of the Iberian exceptionalism or racial democracy thesis that might hold. If the strong version of the racial democracy thesis is correct, we should find little if any racial prejudice in the three Latin countries. If the weak version of the racial democracy thesis is correct, although racial prejudice in these three Latin countries will be significantly greater than zero, it should still be significantly less than that found in the United States.
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 50 participants from Cuba (14 females and 36 males), 47 from the Dominican Republic (21 females and 23 males), 58 from Puerto Rico (32 females and 26 males), and 64 from the United States (18 females and 46 males). All participants were recruited from a major metropolitan city within each country: Havana, Santo Domingo, San Juan, and Los Angeles, respectively. Nonprobability convenience samples were used and the participants were recruited in commercial areas (e.g., malls, commercial promenades). Because of the sensitivity of this research topic in Cuba, a snowball sampling procedure was used for this sample. The average age was 33 years old for Cuba, 27 for the Dominican Republic, 29 for Puerto Rico, and 36 for the United States.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE

Explicit Prejudice
Explicit prejudice was defined by the use of the same two-item scale in all four nations. The items were as follows: (a) "Blacks are less intelligent than other groups," and (b) "Blacks are less capable than other groups." Each question had a seven-category response scale ranging from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree (1). For such a short scale, the reliability of the scale was acceptably to very high in all four nations: the Dominican Republic (α = .90), Puerto Rico (α = .94), Cuba (α = .74), and the United States (α = .84). The reliability within the total sample as a whole was .87.
Implicit Prejudice
Two native researchers helped to assess the participants' implicit prejudice scores within each country. One researcher performed the assessment task, and the other recruited the participants and kept interruptions during the experiment to a minimum. The researchers set up a table with two chairs opposite each other-one for the participant and one for the researcher conducting the experiment. The researchers used a stopwatch to time the participants throughout the various phases of the experiment.
Implicit racial prejudice scores were obtained using a slight variation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) . We used normal playing cards with photographs of Black and White Latin American (for Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba) or American (for the United States) faces as well as drawings representing something good and something bad (see Figure 1 ). There was a total of 32 photographs-16 White and 16 Black-taken from Latin American and American high school yearbooks. The people in the stimulus photographs were all dressed the same-males with similar tuxedos and women with similar ballroom gowns-and all had similar expressions on their faces (equally smiling or serious) and were broadly matched for physical attractiveness, all in an effort to control for the socioeconomic status, attractiveness, and likeability cues that attire and facial expression might emit. After pilot testing several symbols in Latin America and the United States, a circle with two dots representing the eyes and either a concave-upward parabola or a concave-downward parabola representing the mouth were considered the best symbols of the evaluation of good and bad cross-culturally (see Figure 1 ). There were 16 cards with the same "good" drawing affixed to them and 16 cards with the same "bad" drawing affixed to them-32 cards in all. All photographs and drawings were printed in black-and-white.
Participants were told that they would be participating in an "association task to see the ease with which they associated good or bad with Black and White faces." In the first phase, participants were asked to provide basic demographic information about themselves (e.g., gender, age, and race). In Latin America, participants were coded as White if they selfcategorized as "Blanco," "Mulatto" (or mixed-race), "Trigueño," or "Indio," and as Black if the participants self-categorized as either "Moreno" or "Negro." 2 In the United States, participants were placed into three initial self-identified categories: "White," "light-or brownskinned African American," and "dark-skinned African American." This resulted in 24 Whites, 21 Mulattoes, and 5 Blacks in Cuba; 9 Whites, 28 Mulattoes, and 10 Blacks in the Dominican Republic; 30 Whites, 23 Mulattoes, and 4 Blacks in Puerto Rico; and 28 Whites, 14 light/brown-skinned African Americans, and 21 dark-skinned African Americans in the United States.
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In the second phase, participants were asked to familiarize themselves with the photographs and evaluation cards. They first had 20 seconds to become familiar with the 16 White faces and 16 Black faces. These 16 faces were arranged in a four-by-four matrix and printed on an 8 ½ × 11 in. sheet of paper. Approximately half of the participants were first given the White faces to inspect and approximately half first given the Black faces to inspect. Next, they had 10 seconds to familiarize themselves with the good and bad drawings, where approximately half of the participants were first given the good drawing and approximately half first given the bad drawing. These drawings were arranged in a four-by-four matrix and printed on an 8 ½ × 11 in. sheet of paper.
In the third phase of the assessment, the participants practiced single-sorting into piles. They were given 8 well-shuffled cards-four with Black faces affixed to them and four with White ones. They were timed on how fast they placed the Black faces on their left side (or their right side) on a table and the White faces on the opposite side. The placement of the cards was counterbalanced across participants. The participants were instructed to sort the cards "as fast as you can while being as accurate as you can." They were similarly timed on how fast they sorted eight evaluation cards-four good and four bad.
In the final and critical phase, participants engaged in double-sorting into piles (the association task). The participants were given all 64 cards well shuffled (the 32 photographs of the Black and White faces and the 32 good and bad evaluation cards). They were timed on how fast they placed the Black faces and the good evaluation cards on one side (on the left side or the right side) and the White faces and the bad evaluation cards on the opposite side. They did this twice (the first time was for practice) while being told to sort "as fast as you can while being as accurate as you can." Following that task, the participants engaged in the opposite pairing when asked to double-sort again. That is, they were timed twice on how fast they placed the Black faces and the bad evaluation cards together on one side and the White faces and the good evaluation cards together on the opposite side. The left and right side placement of the pairings, as well as which set of pairings the participants would do first, was counterbalanced across participants. Implicit racial prejudice was calculated by subtracting the time (in seconds) taken to sort stereotypic pairings (i.e., Bad-Black and Good-White) from the time taken to sort the counterstereotypic pairings (i.e., Good-Black and BadWhite), using the second set of timings of this last phase. Positive difference scores indicate more facile stereotypic associations than counterstereotypic and thus higher implicit racial prejudice against Blacks relative to Whites; zero difference scores indicate that both associations were equally accessible and are interpreted as showing no racial prejudice; negative difference scores are interpreted as implicit prejudice in favor of Blacks. The four phases of the experiment took an average of 45 minutes to complete.
RESULTS
CONSTRUCT VALIDATION OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT PREJUDICE MEASURES
Before proceeding to the substantive questions of the study, we first made some effort to establish the construct validity of both the explicit and implicit measures of prejudice. Although the explicit prejudice measure has a substantial degree of face validity, we decided to explore its construct validity in a more objective manner to be in a better position to assess the construct validity of the implicit measure of prejudice in comparison to the construct validity of the explicit measure. In both cases, our validity criterion was "racial/pigment" category. We reasoned that if the explicit, anti-Black racism measure was valid, there should be a difference in explicit racism scores as a function of participant's racial selfclassification. In particular, those classifying themselves as Black should have significantly lower explicit racism scores than those classifying themselves as either White or Mulatto (or light/brown-skinned African American). Using a one-way analysis of variance with this three-category racial classification scheme (i.e., White, Mulatto/light/brown-skinned, Black), the results were consistent with expectations. There was a significant overall difference in the level of explicit anti-Black racism, F(2, 213) = 6.15, p < .003, η 2 = .23, and the contrasts between Blacks and the two other racial categories were highly significant (i.e., M Whites -M Blacks = .821, p < .004; M Mulatto/light/brown-skinned -M Blacks = .967, p < .003). 4 We repeated the same analyses with respect to the implicit measure of prejudice. Using the same three racial/pigment categories, the nature of these group differences was also consistent with expectations. The overall differences between groups was highly significant, F(2, 211) = 5.91, p < .003, η 2 = .23, and the contrasts between Blacks and the two other groups were also highly significant (i.e., M Whites -M Blacks = 9.93, p < .001; M Mulatto/light/brownskinned -M Blacks = 7.95, p < .007).
Altogether, although the explicit and implicit prejudice measures were not found to be correlated with each other (r = .04, ns)-a common finding in the implicit prejudice litera-ture (see Blair, 2001 )-using racial/pigment group membership as our validity criterion, both measures showed evidence of construct validity.
Strong Racial Democracy Thesis
Our first substantive question concerns the absolute levels of racial prejudice in the Americas and can be regarded as a test of the strong version of the racial democracy or Iberian exceptionalism thesis. Whereas evidence of implicit racial prejudice against Blacks has been found in more than 30 studies in the United States (see review by Blair, 2001 ), the strong version of the racial democracy hypothesis would expect this prejudice to be absent in Latin America.
Because of the small number classifying themselves as Negroes in Cuba and Puerto Rico, to facilitate North American and Latin American comparisons in all subsequent analyses, and consistent with the "one-drop rule" in the United States, we classified all participants with any discernible degree of African heritage into the same "Black/Brown" group. This simply meant combining the Mulatto and Negro categories for the Latin American participants, and light-skinned and dark-skinned African Americans for the U.S. participants. We then tested the strong version of the Iberian exceptionalism thesis within these White and Black/Brown categories for each of the four samples.
Because the scores on the implicit prejudice measure can be regarded as defining a ratio scale with a meaningful zero-point (i.e., zero = absence of implicit prejudice), the implicit prejudice measure allows us to test the strong version of the racial democracy (Iberian exceptionalism) thesis. To test this thesis, we conducted a series of one-sample t tests against the null hypothesis that the level of implicit prejudice within the Latin nations would be zero, while being significantly greater than zero among Whites in the United States.
We started first with the participants in the United States and found, consistent with the overwhelming body of previous research, that European Americans had a level of implicit prejudice against Blacks that was significantly greater than zero. This is to say that it was easier for them to associate positive things with Whites and negative things with Blacks than the reverse, t(26) = 2.69, p < .02 (see Table 1 ). However, although African Americans showed a very slight tendency toward pro-Black/anti-White implicit prejudice, this tendency was not statistically greater than zero, t(32) = -.68, p > .05.
We found that same general trend for all three Latin American samples as well. Whites had levels of implicit prejudice against Blacks that were significantly greater than zero within each nation: Cuba, t(23) = 4.56, p < .001; Dominican Republic, t(8) = 2.84, p < .02; and Puerto Rico, t(29) = 4.21, p < .001 (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, and in contrast to the results found for the United States, this anti-Black prejudice was also shared by those with discernible degrees of African heritage (i.e., Mulattoes and Negroes): for Cuba, t(25) = 4.08, p < .001; for the Dominican Republic, t(37) = 2.58, p < .02; and for Puerto Rico, t(26) = 3.54, p < 01. Therefore, these data appear to clearly contradict the strong version of the Iberian exceptionalism thesis. Not only can evidence of implicit anti-Black racial prejudice be found among Latin American as well as North American Whites (i.e., Whites from the United States), but it can also be found among Latin Americans of color.
Weak Racial Democracy Thesis
Inspection of Table 1 also appears to contradict the weak version of Iberian exceptionalism. As we can see in Table 1 , there was not a single case in which the implicit prejudice scores were higher in the United States than in any of the three Latin countries. To see if these nationality differences were statistically reliable, we submitted the data to a 4 × 2 ANOVA in which the implicit prejudice scores served as the dependent variable, and nationality (the United States, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba) and race (White vs. Black/ Brown) served as the independent variables.
First, further supporting the construct validity of the implicit prejudice measure, the results of the ANOVA analysis showed a significant effect for race, in that Whites had significantly higher implicit prejudice scores than Blacks/Browns, F(1, 206) = 8.14, p < .01, partial η 2 = .32. Second, there was no significant Race × Nation interaction, F(3, 206) = .51, p = n.s. This indicates that the degree to which Whites had higher anti-Black prejudice levels than Black/Browns was essentially constant across nations.
The ANOVA results also showed that nationality was indeed reliably correlated with implicit prejudice, F(3, 206) = 7.82, p < .001, partial η 2 = .19. Planned comparisons revealed that the only significant differences among the nations were found in the contrasts between the North American sample on one hand, and the three Caribbean samples (i.e., the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Cuba) on the other hand. However, all three of these contrasts clearly contradicted the weak version of the Iberian exceptionalism thesis. Implicit racial prejudice was found to be significantly lower in the United States than in the Dominican Republic (p < .001), Puerto Rico (p < .01), and Cuba (p < .001).
Finally, the weak version of the Iberian exceptionalism hypothesis was also explored by use of the explicit prejudice measure and the same type of two-way ANOVA used above (see Table 2 ). Although there was no significant main effect for race, F(1, 208) = 1.91, p > .10, there was a relatively powerful main effect for nation, F(3, 208) = 16.01, p < .001, η 2 = .43. As can be seen in Table 2 , once again the major national division was between the North American sample, on one hand, and the three Latin American samples on the other hand. This picture was confirmed by inspection of the Scheffé post-hoc comparisons. These showed that the North American sample was significantly less prejudiced than either the Cuban or Dominican samples, whereas there was no significant difference between the North American and Puerto Rican samples. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican sample also had a significantly lower explicit prejudice average than did the Cuban sample. As with the implicit prejudice measure, there was no interaction between nation and race, F(3, 208) < 1.
Because it is now known that even implicit measures of prejudice can be subject to contextual effects (see Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001) , it is possible that the relatively low level of implicit racial prejudice found in the United States is largely due to the relatively intense degree of racial discourse this nation has experienced over the past 45 years and the resultant pressure toward political correctness. If political correctness is a substantial factor affecting these results, there is strong reason to believe that this factor will have its strongest influence on the explicit rather than the implicit, and less controllable, measures of racial prejudice. Thus, if the weak version of the Iberian exceptionalism hypothesis is correct, once one controls for explicit racial prejudice (and thus for political correctness), the Latin American samples should show lower levels of implicit prejudice than found in the North American sample. To test this idea, we ran a two-way analysis of covariance examining implicit prejudice as a function of nation and race, after controlling for the effects of explicit prejudice.
Rather than supporting the Iberian exceptionalism thesis, the results of this covariance analysis contradicted this thesis. Although the effect size for nation was somewhat attenuated after controlling for explicit prejudice (i.e., η 2 = .30 versus η 2 = .49), the results continued to show a significant main effect for nation, F(3, 204) = 7.03, p < .001. Furthermore, post-hoc contrasts showed that the American sample had significantly lower implicit prejudice scores than each of the other three Latin American nations at the .01 level or beyond. Furthermore, and in contrast to the uncorrected implicit prejudice analysis above, after controlling for levels of explicit prejudice, there was now also a significant effect for race, showing that Whites had significantly higher implicit prejudice scores than Blacks, F(1, 204) = 6.91, p < .01, η 2 = .18. This latter finding is also important because it provides further support for the construct validity of the implicit measure. This is to say that one would expect Blacks to have lower levels of implicit prejudice against Blacks than would Whites, even after controlling for social desirability and political correctness effects. The lack of a Race × Nation interaction indicated that these racial differences were consistent over nation, F(3, 204) < 1 (see Figure 2) .
Finally, to assure ourselves that the national differences found were not a function of the differing ways in which non-Whites classified themselves within the four nations, we also computed an analysis of covariance (controlling for explicit prejudice) using only those participants who self-categorized as unambiguously White within each nation. The results of this analysis continued to display statistically significant cross-national differences, F(1, 84) = 3.55, p < .02, η 2 = .33. Furthermore, the pairwise contrasts also continued to show significantly lower levels of implicit prejudice among Whites in the United States than among Whites in Latin America; however, the contrast between North American and Puerto Rican Whites was only marginally significant (i.e., p < .06). 
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DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study has been to explore the empirical validity of the Iberian exceptionalism (or racial democracy) thesis using explicit and implicit measures of racial prejudice. When exploring potentially explosive and sensitive topics such as racial prejudice, it is well known that explicit measures of prejudice can be quite sensitive to social desirability and self-presentation effects in a way that implicit measures are not (e.g., Crosby et al., 1980; Greenwald et al., 1998) . Because these self-presentational and context effects might well vary across nations, concentrating on implicit rather than explicit racial prejudice would seem to be a more fruitful approach to these cross-national comparisons.
Use of the implicit measure of racial prejudice provided no support whatsoever for the Iberian exceptionalism thesis, in either its strong or its weak form. Not only was significant implicit racial prejudice against Blacks found among Whites in all the nations examined, but this anti-Black prejudice was found also among Latin American participants with discernible African heritage as well (i.e., Mulattoes and Negroes). Although showing less antiBlack prejudice than Whites, the fact that Latin American Blacks also had a tendency to exhibit significant levels of anti-Black prejudice is consistent with the notion that a certain degree of prejudice against members of subordinate groups is consensually shared by both members of dominant and subordinate groups alike within hierarchical social systems (see, e.g., Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001; Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001) . Furthermore, even though the explicit and implicit measures of prejudice are suspected of assessing slightly different psychological processes-at least under certain conditions (see Blair, 2001 )-and the fact that the two measures of prejudice were not found to correlate in this study, both indices converged on the same general conclusion concerning the Iberian exceptionalism thesis. In direct contradiction to the racial democracy claim, both indices suggested higher levels of anti-Black prejudice in Latin America than in North America.
Altogether, these findings seem to present us with something of a paradox. Although it seems relatively well established that explicit racism has had a substantially less ferocious history in the Caribbean than in the United States (see, e.g., Freyre, 1951; Twine, 1998) , this regional difference does not appear to be reflected in either explicit or more unconscious forms of prejudice within contemporary populations. Not only were both explicit and implicit prejudice in the Caribbean higher than in the United States, but it is also noteworthy that the levels of both forms of racial prejudice in socialist (ostensibly classless) Cuba appeared no less severe than that found in either the Dominican Republic or the AmericanPeña et al. / RACIAL DEMOCRACY 759 "Good" " Bad" controlled island of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, despite the very high level of miscegenation in the Dominican Republic, participants in this sample also failed to exhibit particularly low levels of either explicit or implicit prejudice. This finding is consistent with the recent observation that racial prejudice and pigmentocracy are quite compatible with relatively high levels of interracial marriage and miscegenation (see Sidanius, Peña, & Sawyer, 2001 ). Although it is not possible to attach any absolute interpretation to any given level of explicit prejudice, this limitation does not quite apply in the case of our index of implicit prejudice.
Here, a score of zero really can be defined as the absence of implicit racial prejudice. Given this, our findings also appear to suggest that neither the elimination of the class struggle (as in Cuba) nor the creation of high levels of miscegenation (as in the Dominican Republic) is a sufficient condition for the elimination of implicit and unconscious racial prejudice. Nonetheless, we are still forced to reach these conclusions with a certain degree of tentativeness and caution. First, we must keep in mind that this study used nonprobability samples. Whether or not these results would also hold within probability samples from each nation remains to be seen. Second, despite the suggestion that implicit and assumedly unconscious racial prejudice is higher in the Caribbean than in North America, the extent to which this implicit prejudice expresses itself in actual discriminatory behavior is also an open question that needs to be settled by further research. Third, it is entirely possible that, on both the implicit and explicit measures, we are capturing the effects of the Civil Rights Movement. Whereas one might attribute the lower levels of explicit prejudice in the United States to political correctness, driven by the Civil Rights Movement and the myriad of antiracist organizations and discourses, the implicit measures are more likely to reflect the degree to which these discourses perhaps affect individuals on a subconscious level. Furthermore, the national differences in implicit prejudice held even after controlling for levels of explicit prejudice and what is assumed to be an associated political correctness. Although there may be racial resentment brought on by protest, race-specific policies, minority incorporation, and so on, on balance and in comparison to countries that have had no such movements, we are led to conclude that the lower levels of prejudice in the United States as compared to Latin America are probably genuine and not merely artifactual. This interpretation is consistent with the conclusions of political scientist Taeku Lee, who argues that Civil Rights protests changed the opinions of many Whites in the United States about Blacks (Lee, 2002) . Fourth, although the choice of these particular three Latin American countries is potentially heuristic, a good deal of further research remains to determine the extent to which these findings generalize to other nations across the Caribbean and Latin America.
These qualifications notwithstanding, the results are still important because, as far as we know, this study reports the first use of implicit attitude measures within either Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, or Cuba and suggests that Latin America may not be nearly as egalitarian as some have argued. The results also may speak to the power of antiracist social movements in determining both implicit and explicit prejudice. That is, implicit prejudice is perhaps affected by the intervention of antiracist discourse and policies specifically bringing racial inequality to consciousness. They also suggest that the implicit and explicit measures of racial prejudice may have a more indirect relationship to historic or current racial barriers and inequality than previously thought. We are thus left with a more complex portrait of racial orders in the United States and Latin America, and one that provides mixed indicators of which model is more egalitarian. As Degler (1986) noted in his classic work,
